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Abstract. This study sought to determine whether fiscal policy for Kenya is on a 
sustainable path by estimating a fiscal reaction function.   A fiscal reaction function is a rule 
derived from an inter-temporal government budget constraint which reveals the response of 
government to accumulating public debt. It also sought to establish whether fiscal policy 
responds to business cycles by determining its cyclical nature. The study used annual time 
series data spanning 1970 to 2013 and multivariate analysis was based on VAR and VECM 
model. The empirical analysis reveals that, firstly fiscal behavior is incoherent with inter-
temporal budget constraint and the moderation is low. This implies that if fiscal adjustment 
is not done, debt is likely to accumulate. Secondly, election cycles expenditures threaten 
Kenya’s long run fiscal sustainability. Finally, fiscal policy is a-cyclical meaning that 
stabilization objective is not considered while conducting the fiscal policy. The study 
recommends that fiscal rules, independent fiscal committee and comprehensive fiscal 
regulations laws should be enacted to correct these biases. 
Keywords.Fiscal policy, Sustainability, Fiscal reaction. 
JEL.E62, H30, Q56. 
 
1. Introduction 
iscal policy entails the deliberate measures by the government to influence 
the direction and the performance of the economy so as to attain specific set 
objectives namely; fostering macroeconomic stability, efficient allocation of 
resources and fair distribution of income. Fiscal policy adjustments are normally 
effected through alterations in the composition and level of government 
expenditure, changes in tax revenue or changes in tax structure. The effects are 
either realized through automatic stabilization or discretionary changes through the 
fiscal budget. Automatic stabilizers are those elements of fiscal policy thatreduce 
tax burdens and increase public spending without discretionary government action.  
Kenya’s fiscal policy stance is mainly geared towards macroeconomic stability, 
sustainable growth and conducive environment for investment and innovation. As 
articulated in budget strategy paper 2012/2013 and 2013/2014 financial years, a 
sound fiscal policy should not only be sustainable but should also create fiscal 
space for counter cyclicality in case the economy is exposed to destabilizing 
shocks. Some of the key indicators of the soundness of fiscal policy are debt to 
GDP ratio and fiscal deficit as a %age of the GDP. To ensure fiscal sustainability, 
Kenya targets a fiscal deficit of 3.6% by 2013 while East Africa community target 
is 6%. On the other hand, as a %age of GDP,  public debt increased from 44.5% in 
the previous financial year to 49.8% in 2013/2014 financial year with the projected 
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trend being expected to hit 53.3% in 2014/2015 far above the debt target of 40% of 
the overall GDP. 
This raising debt and fiscal deficit is attributed to increasing government 
expenditure and a slower growth in revenues. The rising deficit is not only a threat 
to fiscal consolidation efforts but also poses a great challenge to macroeconomic 
stability. In addition, it does not only constraints the fiscal space required to design 
and implement a countercyclical fiscal policy but also raises concerns on 
sustainability of such a policy.  
Fiscal policy is sustainable if it satisfies the inter-temporal budget constraint. 
This means that the present value of future primary surpluses should be equal or 
more than the current level of debt(Alesina et al,2011; Bohn, 1998). As debt 
accumulates, the government should run sufficient future surpluses if debt is to 
remain non explosive. It implies that the government can run the current fiscal 
policy overtime without altering taxation or leading to excessive debt 
accumulation. Fiscal sustainability implies good management of public resources.  
Unsustainable fiscal policy has adverse consequences on the economy and the 
welfare of its citizens. Specifically, it results into a non- stable macroeconomic 
environment which manifest in financial crisis, weak currency, explosive debt, 
financial sector failure and volatile interest rates.  In addition, non sustainable fiscal 
policy exposes economies to external shocks, harms the welfare of the state 
through large fiscal deficits and excessive debt stocks and generates an inefficient 
allocation of resources. Excessive public debt does not only affect future 
generations but also leads to inflation volatility(Anca, 2011). 
 Secondly, it has implications on financial markets and monetary policy stance 
too. For instance, high public debt and fiscal deficit levels create expectations in 
financial markets that government is likely to default on debt hence, investors 
demand a higher interest rate on government debt to compensate for the apparent 
risk that the government may not be able to repay its loans, causing a sudden and 
sharp increase in the government’s financing costs. The ultimate effect is to crowd 
out private borrowing due to rising cost of credit. High debt levels may also force 
the government to monetize the debt or create a surprise inflation, which in turn 
jeopardizes monetary policy stance (Renee & Weinberg 2007). 
As earlier cited, macroeconomic stabilization is one of the key fiscal policy 
objectives in Kenya. An automatically stabilizing fiscal policy is crucial in 
cushioning the economy against macroeconomics shocks. For Kenya, the Vision 
2030 is based on the assumption that fiscal policy remains sustainable and 
stabilizing. A stabilizing fiscal policy should not lean on the wind; the government 
should spend more during economic downswing and spend less during up swing. 
Such a policy is said to be counter cyclical. Counter cyclical policies as attributed 
to strong automatic fiscal stabilizers should mitigate both short run and long run 
business cycles rather than amplifying them. However, empirical evidence has that 
most developing economies fiscal policies are procyclical, meaning that they lean 
on the wind hence accelerating instabilities especially after shocks,(Halland & 
Bleaney, 2009;Alesina et al, 2008;Ilzetzki & Vegh 2008;Mcmanus & Ozkan, 
2012). 
 It’s therefore essential to understand the fiscal sustainability prospects for 
Kenya and from a wide perspective that assesses not only fiscal sustainability, but 
also automatic stabilizers property of the fiscal tools. One way of assessing fiscal 
sustainability is through an assessment of how a government reacts to changes in 
its debt position. For a country like Kenya that has seen considerable increases in 
total debt levels, an understanding of how the country changes its fiscal policy 
stance in relation to changing debt positions is important. Fiscal sustainability will 
be achieved if the increases in expenditures are matched with increases in revenue 
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(World Bank, 1990).Further, a stabilizing fiscal policy should be sustainable, 
which implies that it should not lead to excessive debt accumulation. It should also 
be countercyclical implying that, fiscal position should not accommodate business 
cycles but rather counter them.  
Assessment of the government reaction to debt is done through estimation of a 
fiscal reaction function. A fiscal reaction function is a rule that reveals how sound a 
fiscal policy is in terms of sustainability, transmission and cyclicality, (Khalid, 
2007; Mello 2005; Baldi & Karstein 2012; Antonio & Tovar 2011;Stoin & Rui 
2013). Having the right fiscal reaction function makes fiscal policy and public 
finance sound and stable (Nguyen 2013). 
It is against this background that this study seeks to assess the response of the 
Kenyan government to changes in debt position through estimation of a fiscal 
reaction function. This would also give insights into the sustainability of fiscal 
policy in Kenya and also whether fiscal policy stabilizes business cycles in the 
economy. The specific objectives of the study include: 
1. To estimate a fiscal reaction function for Kenya 
2. To asses fiscal sustainability in Kenya 
3. To asses cyclicality of fiscal policy in Kenya 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two provides background 
information. Section three provides the theoretical, empirical literature and 
analytical framework employed in the study. Section four describes the data, 
preliminary diagnostic tests and empirical findings, while Section five concludes 
by providing discussion of results and policy recommendations. 
 
2.Background 
2.1. Fiscal policy stance in Kenya 
Fiscal policy seeks to address macroeconomic instability, fostering higher 
economic growth, reducing poverty rate, and addressing substantial income, asset, 
and regional inequalities. In Kenya, these objective are pursued in government 
policy documents such as Sectional paper No.10 of 1965 on African Socialism and 
its application to Kenya and the Sessional Paper No.1 of 1986 on Economic 
Management for RenewedGrowthEconomic Recovery Strategy (ERS) of 2003, 
Vision 2030,Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) in 2007, the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility 
(PRGF).  
From historical perspective, persistent rise in government expenditure on 
infrastructure, free primary education, military operations, power plants and on 
other social amenities, coupled with persistently raising recurrent expenditure have 
raised total government expenditure to GDP from 29% in 1970 t0 40% in 2013. 
Tax revenue has grown in tandem with the increasing public expenditure, for 
instance from 9% of the GDP in 1970 to 24% in 2013, which is within the expected 
target, however, it hardly suffices the expenditure leading to persistent fiscal 
deficit.  
Notably, fiscal deficit has worsened, from 7% 0f GDP in 2004, to 12% in 2012 
and 14% in 2013. Kenya is in a worse fiscal position compared to East African 
economies like Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania. For instance, in 2008/09, 
2009/010, 2010/11 financial years, fiscal deficit in Uganda was 4.6%,7.2% and 
6.2% respectively. In Tanzania, fiscal deficit remained stable registering 
8.6%,9.3% and 11% respectively. In Burundi, the deficit was relatively low 
showing a drastic decline from 13.6% to 4% in 2009/10 financial year. This is one 
of the challenges leading to delay in signing the East Africa Community agreement 
since the expected deficit benchmark should be 6%. To bridge the gap between 
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revenue and expenditure, tax reforms have been employed severally. Firstly, in the 
wake of 1970s oil crisis minor tax reforms were undertaken. Sales taxes were 
introduced as a means of generating extra revenue and trade taxes were used to 
address the then widening balance of payments deficit.  
During the period 1974 through 1985, the tax rates on both personal and 
corporate income were high with Marginal personal income tax rates ranging from 
10% on the first shilling to a top rate of 65%. The tax rate applied to income of 
domestic corporations was 45% in 1974, while foreign corporations faced a rate of 
52%. However, this did not yield much as expected due to low labour productivity, 
(Wanjala and Karingi, 2005). 
In 1986 Tax Modernization Programme (TMP) was approved aimed at 
broadening the tax base to 28% of GDP in 1992. Subsequently, Budget 
Rationalization Programme intended to place controls on public spending was put 
in place in 1987. In 1991 as part of TMP several tax rates were converted into ad 
valorem tax partially to maximize tax revenue. Other reforms include changes in 
VAT in line with the East Africa community protocol, more reliance on indirect tax 
than direct tax and centralization of tax collection purposely to raise tax revenue 
with zero fiscal deficit being in consideration. Although tax revenue has grown 
overtime, the zero deficit targets have remained elusive, (Nado, 2009). 
Consequently, public debt is used to bridge the gap with the current external 
debt increasing by 28.7% from Ksh 843.6 billion in June 2013 to Ksh 1085.9 
billion in June 2014 largely as a result of the issuance of the International 
Sovereign Bond and depreciation of the Kenya shilling against the Euro, dollar, 
Sterling Pound and other major world currencies,(GOK,2024).  
This persistent fiscal deficit and a raising public debt raise questions on whether 
fiscal policy is sustainable in Kenya. On the other hand, it suggests that fiscal 
policy in Kenya, leans on the wind; that is fiscal policy is run with no consideration 
on business cycles. Such fiscal policies tend to amplify business cycles or remains 
non responsive to short run business cycles at all. In addition, macroeconomic 
stability remains at stake, (Halland & Bleaney, 2009, Alesina et al, 2008, Ilzetzki & 
Vegh 2008, Mcmanus and Ozkan, 2012).A sustainable fiscal policy must meet the 
inter-temporal constraint, (Ostry et al 2010). 
2.2. Revenue and expenditure trends 
 
 
Figure 1.Revenue and expenditure as a %age of GDP 
Source: Economic suvey(2012, 2013,2014) 
 
Figure 1 above, shows a consistent gap between tax revenue and government 
expenditure measured in GDP especially in the period between 1980 to 2004 as 
government expenditure proportion of GDP rises to 56% far above 18% TR/GDP 
in 1993. However, TR/GDP has also grown over time courtesy of various tax 
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reforms. Although 1970 was characterized by financial crisis originating from oil 
shock, the declining revenue was countered by 1972/73 tax reforms where sales tax 
replaced consumption tax and corporate tax was increased by 5%.The introduction 
of TMP in 1886 lead to a gradual increase in tax revenue as a proportion of GDP 
reaching 18% of GDP in 1993. There is also a slight decline in government 
expenditure from 1987 t0 1991 which is attributed to Budget Rationalization 
Programme enacted in 1987 intended to place controls on public spending.  
However, the effect was short lived as government expenditure proportion to 
GDP took a drastic upswing immediately after 1991 to 56% of GDP attributed to 
multiparty politics and structural reforms held in the same period. From 1994 
revenue takes a down turn partially due to the declining yield of the VAT (Wanjala 
& Karingi, 2005). Another substantial change in revenue to GDP proportion is 
experienced from 2004 to 2013 as revenue to GDP %age ratio raises from 12% to 
21% in 2004, stabilizing at 26% in 2013. Overly, this growth in tax revenue is 
attributed to the success of TMP (Wanjala & Karingi, 2005) among other tax 
reforms and institutional measures. 
In regard to government expenditure, Medium Term Plan for (2008-2012) of 
Vision 2030 provides the expenditure priorities for the Government for 2011/12-
2012/13. In 2012/13, overall expenditures were projected at 29.8%. However, the 
target was far much surpassed by expenditure which hit 41% of GDP in 2013. The 
substantial growth in government expenditure is attributed to increasing recurrent 
and investment expenditure by the government and the fiscal stimulus undertaken 
between 2008/09 and2010/11, (GOK 2012). However, effectiveness of fiscal 
restrains is expected if implementation of the Integrated Financial Management 
Information System (IFMIS) across Ministries and Departments and subsequently 
at the county level following decentralization is fully put in place. 
 
 
Figure 2. Nominal total revenue and government expenditure (Ksh Million) 
Source: Economic suvey (2012, 2013,2014) 
 
A look at figure2 above shows that tax revenue has increased over time from a 
total tax revenue amounting to Ksh 371989.1 million in 2006/07 to Ksh 1006862 
million in 2013/14. The increase in tax revenue is attributed to significant increase 
in income revenue, trade tax revenue, VAT and excise tax revenue over the same 
period. Substantial growth in exercise duty growth is in the wake of tax amnesty 
and a waiver of interest on all tax arrears in 2004.However, government 
expenditure is consistently higher than tax revenue generating a persistent deficit in 
the economy. Figure 3 below shows tax efforts and government expenditure to 
rebased GDP in %age. The trend reveals a steady tax effort ranging between 19% 
t0 21% of the GDP. Similarly, the proportion of government expenditure to GDP 
has risen to 32% in 2013/14. 
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Figure3. Total revenue and Government expenditure as % of rebased GDP 
Source: Authors computation using Data from economic survey(various issues) 
 
2.3. Fiscal balance and public debt GDP ratio 
Public debt is composed of both domestic and external borrowing by the 
government. Debt is often used to finance the government deficit in Kenya for 
instance fiscal stimulus of 2009 t0 2011 lead to growth of public debt to 45% of 
GDP.  
Debt to GDP ratio remains high at 52% of GDP in 2013 rising from 42% in 
2010 as shown figure 4 below.  The projected ratio is to increase to 53% of GDP. 
However, looking at debt trend after GDP rebasing, the ration is still high at 40% 
in 2013.  Looking at the figure above, high debt ratios are observed especially 
between the period 1993 to 1994, 2000 and 2004, 2008 and 2012.  Such periods are 
associated with high deficit ratios implying that deficits are funded by increased 
debt. The declining debt trend overtime can be attributed to continued fiscal 
consolidation efforts that started in 2010/11 budget as well as efficiency in 
spending and improved tax performance following reforms in expenditure 
management and tax legislations. 
 
 
Figure 4.Fiscal deficit and Debt GDP ratio 
Source: Economic suvey(1975 to 2014) 
 
The government envisages in 2012 budget strategy paper that the sustained 
easing of debt to GDP ratio will provide a room to conduct countercyclical fiscal 
policy should the economic situation worsen in the future. However, the debt 
burden is on increasing trend as the cost of servicing debt increased from 2008 
amounting to KSh250 billion in 2013. The increase in debt around 2008 reveals 
that the fiscal stimulus package was funded by debt.  It also suggests that there may 
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be limited fiscal space to run counter cyclical policy in Kenya however this is 
subject to empirical confirmation in this study. It also implies that it is most likely 
that the existing fiscal stance is purely non countercyclical putting macroeconomic 
stability at stake especially in case of unexpected shocks. In the absence of any 
deficit bias, we would observe budgets to be alternatively in deficit and in surplus 
depending on economic and/or political conditions. These fluctuations would be 
mainly driven by business cycles when fiscal policy is run counter cyclically, as 
should be, (Wyploz,  2012). 
2.4.Fiscal stance and business cycles 
One of the key roles of fiscal policy both in the long run and the short run, as 
earlier cited, is to ensure macroeconomic stability. Majorly, it should stabilize 
overall economic performance by ensuring that output gap both in the long run and 
the short run is minimized (Halland & Bleaney, 2009). We assess how fiscal policy 
responds to economic swings, by examine the relationship between primary fiscal 
balance (as the measure of fiscal stance) and output gap (as measure of business 
cycles). Primary balance is the difference between tax revenue and government 
expenditure excluding debt servicing cost. Output gap is the deviation of the actual 
output from potential in a given year. It is computed using the Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP) filter Method. 
The HP filter is a two-sided linear filter that computes the smoothed series y
t
*  
of y
t
 by minimizing the variance of y
t
around y
t
* subject to a penalty that 
constrains the second difference of 
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.Where λ is a parameter which controls the 
smoothness of the series 
When output gap is positive, it means the economy is operating above the 
potential and the aggregate demand is likely to cause macroeconomic instability. 
Similarly, a negative output gap suggests that the economy is operating below is 
potential. A counter-cyclical policy should be expansionary (primary deficit) when 
output gap is negative and tight when the gap is positive(primary surplus). From 
figure 3 below, the economy experienced noticeable down swings 1n 1972 during 
the financial crisis as a result of oil crises that occurred in the same period. Similar 
down swings tend to persist from 1998 to 1992 and 2002 to 2003 consistent with 
economic history in Kenya. The two variables tend to co-move, as noted clearly in 
1972t0 1975,1998 t0 1993, 1996 to 2000 and 2002 to 2005 a strong indication that 
the government has not been pursuing fiscal policy in a manner consistent with the 
business cycle movements. 
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Figure 3. Fiscal stance and business cycles in Kenya 
Source:Source: Authors’ computation, data from KNBS 
 
With the widening fiscal deficit which tends to persist even after KRA meets is 
revenue targets, with increasing debt burden and fiscal stance indicating to be 
inconsistent with business cycles, this sought to assess the soundness fiscal policy 
in Kenya using a fiscal reaction function. 
 
3. Literature Review  
This chapter contains both theoretical and empirical review of literature on 
fiscal reaction function, fiscal sustainability, effectiveness and cyclicality. 
3.1. Theoretical overview 
Keynesian theory postulates that with sticky prices and wages, economy does 
not respond immediately to demand fluctuations hence fiscal policy should be 
countercyclical. A countercyclical fiscal policy helps the economy to adjust more 
completely, and more rapidly, to such fluctuations. Fiscal policy should therefore 
actively smooth the business cycle by lowering taxes and increasing expenditure in 
bad times, thereby increasing aggregate demand, while reducing expenditure and 
increasing savings in good times, (Halland and Bleaney, 2009). Neoclassical 
theoretical perspective stipulates that fiscal policy should aim to minimize 
distortions. Barro’s (1979) tax smoothing hypothesis shows that tax rates should be 
held constant over the business cycle as long as spending shocks or shocks to the 
tax base are temporary. This implies a positive correlation between the budget 
balance with output (Fatás and Mihov, 2009). A pro-cyclical fiscal policy is sub-
optimal both by Keynesian and by neoclassical standards, (Ilzetzki & Vegh 2008). 
3.2. Empirical review 
Fiscal sustainability has received the attention of economic researchers in the 
recent past following the global financial meltdown in 2008 and the subsequent 
debt crisis in Greece 2009.  According to Anca, (2011) running unsustainable fiscal 
policies is not only a recipe for macroeconomic instability but also do expose 
economies to exogenous shocks. An unsustainable fiscal policy characterized by 
large fiscal deficits and excessive public debt stocks has harmful consequences as 
typified by Greece crisis in 2009.Ensuring fiscal sustainability is crucial.  
Gauging fiscal sustainability has taken various analytical angles categorized in 
to stationarity tests where the debt/GDP ratio is tested for unit root. The presence 
of unit root shows that fiscal policy is unsustainable, (Trehan 1991; Corsetti & 
Roubini, 1991; Caporale, 1995; Uctum, 2000). The second category is 
cointegration tests which test for cointegration between tax revenue and 
government expenditure.If the two fiscal variables are not co-integrated, fiscal 
policy is unsustainable. This approach is employed by (Haug 1995; Payne 1997; 
Stoian 2008). The third category is the fiscal reaction function where the 
responsiveness of fiscal primary balance to debt accumulation is tested, if positive 
and significant at conventional levels, an internal debt correction mechanism is said 
to be in existence and fiscal policy is sustainable, (Bohn, 1998;De Mello, 2005; 
Stoian,2006;Ostry, 2007;Mendoza et al., 2011). 
The three categories are based on the inter-temporal budget constraint(IBC). 
However, Bohn (2007) shows that IBC imposes a very weak econometric 
restriction on the series of debt or revenue and expenditure. The study shows how a 
broader of class stochastic processes may comply with an IBC and yet violate 
stationarity and cointegration conditions for sustainability hence invalidating the 
usefulness of the first two approaches. Instead, fiscal reaction approach which 
represents an error-correction type policy reaction function is more promising in 
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understanding fiscal imbalances, (Bohn,2007). A fiscal reaction function checks 
whether the government behavior has been sufficiently responsive to increment in 
debt, (Stoian, 2006; De Mello, 2005).  
Researchers can iterate the government inter-temporal budget constraint to 
produce different fiscal reaction functions (Nguyen, 2013). There are two possible 
approaches used in iteration process. In the first approach, the fiscal reaction 
functions are model-based as in the case of (Penalver & Thwaites 2006) while in 
the second approach which is commonly used, researchers use econometric 
approach to measure the relationship between fiscal balance and the debt /GDP 
ratio plus other macroeconomic variables. This approach is applied by (Bohn, 
1998; de Mello 2005; Khalid et al., 2007; Burger et al., 2011). 
The estimation technique also varies across studies. Bohn,(1998) uses simple 
ordinary least squires(OLS) model to show that US debt is sustainable. Khalid uses 
vector autoregressive approach (VAR) to gauge fiscal sustainability in Pakistan. 
The VAR model includes fiscal deficit, output gap, and inflation. The advantage of 
VAR model is that it does not only show variable relationship in linear models, but 
also provides rich dynamic relationship between variables. Within VAR models, 
transmission, responsiveness and effectiveness of fiscal policy shocks is easily 
captured. Burger et al. (2011) finds consistent results using, OLS, threshold 
autoregressive (TAR), VAR, general methods of moments GMM, vector error 
correction mechanism (VECM), and State-Space methods is South Africa. 
This study employs a VAR method to estimate a fiscal reaction function for 
Kenya. 
3.3.Fiscal cyclicality and fiscal stabilization 
There is a rich literature showing evidence of fiscal procyclicality and 
explaining why fiscal policy in developing economies is rarely countercyclical. 
Gavin and Perotti, (1997) show evidence of fiscal cyclicality differences between 
regions, ((Kaminsky et al., 2004; Talvi & Végh 2005; Ilzetzki & Végh 2008)),  
show similar difference in rich and poor countries or across time for the same 
group of countries (Fatás & Mihov (2009); Gavin & Perotti (1997))  observe that, 
while fiscal policy in the OECD is countercyclical or acyclical, it is procyclical in 
Latin-America. Kaminsky et al. (2004), using various measures of cyclicality in a 
study of 104 countries for the period 1960-2003, confirm the countercyclicality or 
acyclicality of the OECD economies, while finding fiscal procyclicality in 
developing countries. Similarly, (Talvi & Végh 2005) observe that fiscal 
procyclicality is predominant in Latin American feature and in 36 developing 
countries of their sample. Thornton (2008), in a study of 37 African countries over 
the period 1960-2004, finds real government consumption in 32 of these countries 
to be extremely pro cyclical, with half of the countries having a government 
spending response to output fluctuations even above proportionality. 
Woo (2006) using econometric analysis shows that fiscal pro cyclicality bias is 
largely explained by social polarization of preferences arising from inequalities. In 
addition, the study shows that pro cyclical fiscal policy is negatively and strongly 
associated with long run economic growth. Manasse (2006), shows that the severe 
difference in policy cyclicality between developed and developing countries is due 
to the higher severity of the shocks that hit developing countries. 
Other hypothesis that explain fiscal cyclicality are restrictions on access to 
domestic credit, (Caballero & Khrisnamurthy 2004), international credit markets 
(Gavin & Perotti 1997; Calderón & Schmidt-Hebbel (2008), institutions or political 
structures (Lane 2003; Talvi & Végh 2005;Alesina et al., 2008) 
According to Gavin & Perotti (1997) developing countries are less able to 
smooth the business cycle because limited access to international credit markets 
prevents them from borrowing during bad times. Similar argument is supported by 
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(Calderon & Schmidt-Hebbel 2008), using the ratio of foreign liabilities to GDP as 
their measure for financial openness, find that wider access to domestic and foreign 
capital markets enables countries to run countercyclical policies. Riascos & Végh 
(2004) confirm that limited financial depth proxied by domestic credit to the 
private sector is a major constraint to the implementation of countercyclical fiscal 
policy. 
On the other hand Thornton (2008) contrary to (Alesina et al., 2008), in a 
sample of 37 African countries concludes that less corruption leads to more pro-
cyclicality. His explanation is that, if corruption leads to lower levels of tax 
collection, generating lower government expenditure, then better governance may 
be positively correlated with fiscal pro-cyclicality if it increases the tax revenues 
available for fiscal expenditure. This study sought to establish whether fiscal policy 
is pro-cyclical, countercyclical or acyclical in Kenya. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Analytical Framework 
Fiscal reaction function is useful in gauging fiscal sustainability, cyclicality and 
effectiveness of a fiscal policy. The arithmetic’s of fiscal sustainability start with 
government budgetary constraint, Burger et al, (2011), where the constraint is 
represented as, 
 
  pBDiDD ttttt    11 1        (1)
 
 
Where: D is public debt stock, i is nominal interest rate on government bonds, 
and pB is primary balance which can be a surplus or a deficit position. Equation 1 
is also known as the law of motion for debt. Applying forward substitution, 
t=1,t=2,..,t=n, and generalizing, we obtain the intertemporal  budget constraint and 
solvency condition as equation 2, 
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Rearranging equation 2 and discounting by interest rate i, results into equation 3. 
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Equation 3 implies that initial debt stock is related to the intervening primary 
balance and terminal period debt. Imposing the transversality (no Ponzi 
game)condition, that is 
0
1
1
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 which prohibits the government from 
issuing more and more debt without repaying principle and accumulated interest of 
previous debt stock, we obtain equation 4. 
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This is known as the solvency condition. It implies that if the initial debt is 
positive, the government needs to run a positive surplus in future. The relationship 
between nominal GDP and its past and real interest rate and its past can be 
expressed as equation 5 and 6 respectively, that is, 
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Using equation 5 and 6, equation 1 can be transformed into debt to GDP ratio 
time evolution as equation 7 below 
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Where, dt=D/Y ratio of public debt to GDP at time t, g: real economic growth 
rate, bt =B/Y is primary balance and Y is nominal GDP. Equation 7 implies that 
high primary balance and high economic growth rate leads to a lower debt to GDP 
ratio. By rearranging equation 7 we obtain an equation of primary balance below. 
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In empirical estimation following Bohn (1998) a fiscal reaction function is 
represented as  
 
 tttt zdb          (9) 
where   is approximately 
g
gr


1
which measures the presence of internal debt 
correction mechanism by the government. This is the relationship we sought to 
establish in regard to fiscal sustainability. Z is a vector of other variables that are 
targeted by fiscal policy. In this study, Z constitutes output gap-measure of fiscal 
cyclicality, interest rate, exchange rate and inflation rate. It also includes a political 
dummy, to capture electoral effect and lagged revenue to GDP ratio to capture 
fiscal authority’s ability to generate fiscal surplus effect on fiscal position. 
4.2.Model specification 
The study employed a vector autoregressive (VAR) model. According to Sims 
(1980), macroeconomic variables are potentially endogenous hence, structural 
models explicitly dictating causality are mis- specified. Alternatively, A VAR 
model allows the variables to interact without imposing a theoretical structure on 
the estimates. In addition, VAR models allow for rich dynamics relationship 
among a vector of macroeconomic variables. Similar approach has been used by 
(Khalid, 2007; Burger et al., 2011). 
 The VAR model is specified as: 
 
 balprGDPdZxt _,_,               (10)
 
 
Where Xt  is a vectorof fiscal primary balance as a ratio of GDP( pr_bal), debt to 
GDP ratio (d_GDP), while Z is a set of economic variables that have influence on 
fiscal policy behavior. Particularly, vector Z includes output gap (y_gap) proxied 
as the trend obtained with the Hodrick-Prescott filter to capture the influence of 
business cycles (Bohn, 1998; De Mello, 2005); commodity prices (CPI), capture 
the effects of price movement on the fiscal position, real effective exchange rate 
(reer) to capture the effect of persistent depreciation on fiscal position regarding 
external debt services and the pass through effect on inflation. Following Asiama et 
al, (2014) fiscal stance in developing countries is highly influenced by national 
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elections which tend to be accompanied by excessive budget overruns. Therefore, 
Z also includes a dummy variable, p_dummy to capture possibly electoral effects. 
According to Asiama et al, 2014 and Abiad et al, 2005 key factor distinguishing 
fiscal structures between developing countries and developed economies is the 
relatively lower revenue-to-GDP base of the former. A lagged total revenue-to-
GDP ratio (TR_GDP) was used as a proxy for the capacity of the fiscal institution 
to deliver a primary surplus. Following (Khalid et, al 2007) a structural VAR 
model is represented as  
 tt
i
p
j
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1
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Where  t
a vector of error terms is, is a matrix of coefficients capturing the 
contemporaneous effects of variables on each other. 
0
is a vector of constant 
terms. Z t  are the matrices of coefficients measuring the lagged effects of variables 
on each other.  t
is a vector of error terms that contains zero mean, constant 
variance and serially as well as cross uncorrelated innovations. i.e. these elements 
represent pure structural shocks. Through mathematical manipulation, the Standard 
reduced form VAR with lagged variables on the right hand side can be expressed 
as 
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However the reduced form disturbances are generally known to be correlated 
hence it is necessary totransform the reduced form model into a structural form 
model (Mutuku & Koech, 2014). This is known as VAR identification in 
econometrics jargon. This study employed recursive identification approach which 
implies a causal ordering of the variables in the model based on contemporaneous 
effector on the behavior of variables in the economy also known as 
recursive orthogonolization. 
4.3. Data sources and Definition of Variables 
The study employed annual time series data spanning the period 1996Q1 -
2014Q4. These were obtained from Central Bank of Kenya, International financial 
statistics and Kenya National Bureau of statistics.  
 
Table 1. Variable definition and description 
Variable Type of 
Variable 
Measurement A prior 
expectation 
Debt to GDP ratio continuous Ratio -ve or +ve 
0ut put gap continuous Ratio -ve or +ve 
Consumer price index continuous index -ve 
Real effective exchange rate continuous index +ve 
Primary balance as a ratio of 
GDP 
continuous Ratio +ve 
Interest rate continuous %age +ve 
Political dummy Binary  I or 0 if national 
elections take place 
-ve 
Lagged total revenue to 
GDP ratio 
continuous ratio +ve 
Source: Author,(2014) 
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5. Findings 
5.1.Diagnostic Tests 
This section outlines some preliminary tests to gauge the fitness of the model 
run. 
5.1.1. Test for unit roots 
Macroeconomic time series variables mostly exhibit time variant moments. This 
can be confirmed through stationarity test. In testing for stationarity, this study 
employed the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron..ADF test was 
employed with intercept and lag length selected based on the SIC information 
criterion to ensure that the residuals are white noise. The decision criterion 
involves comparing the computed tau values with the Mackinnon critical values for 
rejection of a hypothesis of a unit root. 
 
Table 1. Test for stationarity results 
Unit root test with trend and intercept  
Variable ADF PP conclusi
on Level 1st Difference Level 1st Difference  
D_GDP -2.5650*** -5.0894 -2.3738*** -6.2196 I(1) 
OUTPUT GAP -3.8074* -4.8878 -3.3385* -5.7474 I(1) 
LN_CPI -1.03173** -3.7709 -0.6084** -3.9612 I(1) 
LN_NEER -1.03171** -3.7709 -0.6084** -3.9612 I(1) 
PR_BAL -2.5582** -5.9111 -4.3278 -13.0578 I(1) 
LN_R -2.6742** -6.3865 -2.4196** -8.9137 I(1) 
TR_GDP -3.8042* -4.8878 -3.5162* -5.7474 I(1) 
***10%,**5% and *1% significance levels. I(1) integrated of order one 
 
This test shows that all the variables are non- stationary in levels at 1%,5% and 
10% significance level. This means that the individual time series have a stochastic 
trend and do not revert to average or long run values after a shock strikes and the 
distributions has no constant mean and variance. The fact that debt to GDP ratio is 
non stationary is an indication of non sustainability of debt or fiscal indiscipline, 
(Wyploz, 2012).However, as earlier cited, the test is weak. 
5.1.2 Test for co-integration 
Since variables have unit root at level, we tested for long run relationship using 
the Johansen & Juselius (1990) approach to establish the co-integrating vectors. 
Two test statistics are used to test the number of co-integrating vectors, based on 
the characteristic roots.  For both trace and Eigen statistics, the null is at most r co-
integrating vectors. The trace statistics  
 
  
k
ri itrace
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1
)ˆ1ln()(        (13) 
 
The alternative is at most k co integrating vectors. The maximum Eigen 
statistics, 
)ˆ1ln()1,( 1max  rTrr        
 (14) 
The alternative is at most r+1 CI vectors.  It tests rank r+1 by testing if 1
ˆ
r is zero.  
 
Table2.Co-integration test results 
Trace  statistic   
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Hypothesized  Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigen value Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
None *  0.958212  342.6391  169.5991  0.0000 
 At most 1 *  0.887197  221.9833  134.6780  0.0000 
At most 2 *  0.786180  139.0629  103.8473  0.0000  
At most 3 *  0.595858  80.44328  76.97277  0.0265  
At most 4  0.424781  46.01567  54.07904  0.2143  
At most 5  0.302195  25.00148  35.19275  0.4001  
At most 6  0.164440  11.32850  20.26184  0.5108  
At most 7  0.111718  4.501698  9.164546  0.3425  
 Trace test indicates 4 co-integrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level. * denotes rejection of the hypothesis 
at the 0.05 level. **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values.  
Eigen statistic  
Hypothesized Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigen value Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
None *  0.958212  120.6557  53.18784  0.0000  
At most 1 *  0.887197  82.92041  47.07897  0.0000  
At most 2 *  0.786180  58.61966  40.95680  0.0002  
At most 3  0.595858  34.42761  34.80587  0.0554  
At most 4  0.424781  21.01419  28.58808  0.3385  
At most 5  0.302195  13.67298  22.29962  0.4923  
At most 6  0.164440  6.826806  15.89210  0.6906  
At most 7  0.111718  4.501698  9.164546  0.3425  
 Max-eigen value test indicates 3 co integrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level. * denotes rejection of the 
hypothesis at the 0.05 level. **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values.  
 
Both the Eigen and Trace statistic rejects the one co-integration hypothesis at 
5% significance level for at 3 and 4 co integrating relationships respectively. This 
reveals that there is enough statistical evidence for existence a unique co-
integrating vector for the set of variables in the VAR model. Co integration results 
are shown in table 3. Since the set of variables are I(1) and  co-integration has been 
established in Table 3 below ,then it is justifies the estimation of a vector error 
correction model -VECM -to capture the short run dynamism as in granger 
representation theorem without losing the long run data properties. Similarly, a non 
spurious co integrating equation of the variables at level can be estimated as shown 
in table 4 below. 
5.1.3. Optimal lag length selection for the VAR model 
The optimal lag length was selected based on comparison of the following 
information criteria which include Akaike information criterion (AIC) Schwarz 
information criterion (SC), Hannan-Quinn information (HQ) criterion, Final 
prediction error (FPE) and Sequential modified LR test statistic. Majority of the 
criteria as shown in table 2 indicate that the optimal lag length should be 3. 
 
Table 3.Lag selection criteria 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
 Lag Log L LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0  357.9841 NA   1.38e-18 -18.42021 -18.07546 -18.29755 
1  569.1364  322.2852  6.44e-22 -26.16508  -23.06228* -25.06112 
2  649.7278  89.07470  4.31e-22 -27.03831 -21.17747 -24.95307 
3  773.2210   84.49537*   8.90e-23*  -30.16953* -21.55065  -27.10300* 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion. LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 
5% level). FPE: Final prediction error. AIC: Akaike information criterion. SC: Schwarz information 
criterion. HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
 
5.2Estimation of VECM and co integrating model 
This part estimates the long run and the short run model using the VAR and 
VECM approach. 
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The co-integrating model in table 4 above shows that long run coefficients of 
public debt is negative but statistically insignificant hence the government 
intertemprol budget constraint is violated. The results reveal that fiscal authorities’ 
reaction to the accumulating debt is non-systematic and the current fiscal policy is 
unsustainable. Unsustainable fiscal policy means that the expected path for debt is 
much larger than the likely path of future primary surpluses. This implies that 
public debt is likely to accumulate in the long run if the government doesn’t 
generate substantial primary surpluses to deal with public debt. 
Political dummy representing election cycles has negative significant effect in 
the long run behavior of primary balance. 
 
Table 4.Co-integrating model 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] **significance at 5% *significant at 1% 
 
This implies that fiscal position significantly deteriorates during election years 
probably due to expenditure overruns associated with the national elections. This 
implies that elections associated expenditure threaten the long term fiscal 
sustainability of Kenya’s public finance.  
In regard to revenue collection capability proxied by revenue to GDP ratio, 
there is a weak surplus generating capacity of the fiscal institution in the long run 
as the coefficient was positive and statistically insignificant. This suggests fiscal 
institutions have improved substantially in efficiency and ability to collect tax 
revenue although more reforms should be encouraged to ensure overall fiscal 
sustainability. The coefficient of the output gap is positive but statistically 
insignificant at 5% level, implying fiscal policy is a cyclical in Kenya. Acyclical 
fiscal policy implies that the policy lacks automatic stabilization effect and in case 
of destabilizing shocks, the effect is likely to be relatively distortive to 
macroeconomic stability. The coefficient of output gap is positive bus insignificant 
at 5% statistical level. This implies that fiscal policy in Kenya is not a cyclical, i.e 
it does not counter debt accumulation. 
5.3 The Short Run Results-Vector error correction model 
The error correction coefficient is -0.1260 as shown in the error correction 
model in table 5. This suggests that 13% of any disequilibrium is corrected in every 
quarter. In addition, as Asiema et al 2014 reveals, it implies that the explanatory 
variables Granger-cause primary balance in the long run. 
 
Dependent Variable: PR_BAL   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
P_DUMMY  -0.041314  0.018265  -2.261995 0.0302 
TR_GDP  0.049288  0.116502  0.423069 0.6749 
Y_GAP  0.088832  0.113340  0.783765 0.4386 
LNR  -0.002566  0.010624  -0.241528 0.8106 
LNCPI  -0.014881  0.008689  -1.712693 0.0959 
LN_NEER  -0.001186  0.008258  -0.143626 0.8866 
D_GDP  -0.089707  0.061681  -1.454364 0.1550 
C  -0.009043  0.031767  -0.284656 0.7776 
PR_BAL(-1)  0.175866  0.148241  1.186352 0.2437 
R-squared 0.453168    Akaike info criterion  -3.667579 
F-statistic 3.522037    Schwarz criterion  -3.298956 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.004555    Hannan-Quinn criter.  -3.531642 
     Durbin-Watson stat  2.179206 
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Table 5.Vector error correction model 
**significance at 5% *significant at 1% 
 
 
Figure 4.Impulse response functions 
 
Figure four below shows the response of macroeconomic variables to fiscal 
tightening. One standard deviation tightening in fiscal policy significantly reduces 
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 -0.126025 
D(PR_BAL(-1)) -0.845929* 
D(PR_BAL(-2)) -0.165028 
D(P_DUMMY(-1)) -0.065271** 
D(P_DUMMY(-2)) -0.023981 
D(TR_GDP(-1)) -0.156002 
D(TR_GDP(-2)) -0.491801** 
D(Y_GAP(-1))  0.040525 
D(Y_GAP(-2)) -0.130498 
D(LNR(-1))  0.029399 
D(LNR(-2))  0.001372 
D(LNINFL(-1)) -0.026396 
D(LNINFL(-2)) -0.001555 
D(LN_NEER(-1)) -0.133071 
D(LN_NEER(-2)) -0.189955** 
D(D_GDP(-1)) -0.027053 
D(D_GDP(-2))  0.105700 
D(LNCPI(-1))  0.032817 
D(LNCPI(-2))  0.163872 
C -0.001762 
 R-squared  0.695255 
 F-statistic  2.521585* 
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price level for a period of 8 years. A similar effect is realized on exchange rate but 
with a lag of 3 years. However, the effect decays completely after one year. In the 
other hand, fiscal shocks have no effect on output gap or interest rate implying that 
fiscal policy effect is not transmitted to these variables. It also emphasizes the 
acyclical nature of fiscal policy in Kenya. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This study focused on estimating a fiscal reaction function and gouging the long 
run sustainability of fiscal policy in Kenya. It also sought to establish the cyclical 
nature of the policy.  It specifically sought to ascertain whether the authorities 
pursued appropriate policies to avert excessive debt accumulation 
The empirical analysis reveals that, firstly fiscal behavior is incoherent with 
intertemporal budget constraint and the moderation is low. This implies that, fiscal 
authorities react nonsystematically to increasing debt threatening fiscal 
sustainability in the long run. It also suggests that if no fiscal adjustment, debt is 
likely to accumulate. Secondly, Election cycles expenditures threaten kenya’s long 
run fiscal sustainability. Thirdly, fiscal policy is acyclical meaning that 
stabilization objective is not considered while conducting the policy. Similar 
results were obtained by Khalid,(2007) and Halland & Bleaney,(2009). Thirdly, 
fiscal shocks have no effect on output gap meaning that the policy is not 
countercyclical to business cycles 
To revert fiscal policy to a sustainable path, address cyclicality and depoliticize 
macroeconomic policy the following should be done: 
Formulate a fiscal rule: Kenya needs an explicit fiscal rule which specifies (a) 
long term debt (debt/GDP) ratio (b) primary fiscal balance (zero, surplus or deficit) 
depending on macroeconomic environment, (c) fiscal convergence rate (average 
rate at which the debt ratio and fiscal balance targets are to be approached incase of 
deviation (3) degree of fiscal counter-cyclicality (amount of stimulus needed in 
case of recession or a boom).  The motivation for fiscal rules is that they correct 
government’s short sightedness resulting from electoral prospects. They also 
contain the size of the government and improve fiscal performance.  However, 
rules may constraint discretionary action when needed hence may accentuate fiscal 
pro-cyclicality. Therefore, rule should be accompanied by escape clause to give 
leeway for discretionary action only when necessary.  Further reason for explicit 
and flexible fiscal rules is that they promote macroeconomic stability through 
countercyclical policies, enhance credibility of government’s fiscal policy and aids 
in deficit elimination. They definitely contribute to long term fiscal sustainability 
Independent fiscal committee/Authority: To depoliticize fiscal policy and 
implement clear fiscal targets, there is a need for an independent fiscal policy 
committee (IFC) to mimic the approach adopted in the case of monetary policy. 
IFC can shield the budgetary process from pressure connected with the electoral 
cycles. IFC should have mandate to set debt target and primary surplus required to 
stabilize debt over a given horizon consistent with business cycle. In addition, IFC 
should have the authority to decide on budget balance on basis of explicit GDP 
forecast so as to break out the vicious cycles of fiscal pro-cyclicality /a-cyclicality 
by setting counter-cyclical budget targets and building surpluses during booms to 
be tapped during recessions. 
Estimating business cycles: Counter cyclicality requires estimation of business 
cycles. IFC should comprise of technical experts to estimate business cycles and 
determine the appropriate fiscal balance consistent with the fiscal rule. It should 
also have the ability to monitor and ensure that the rule is followed. The business 
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cycles estimates should be published regularly (quarterly e,g South Africa) to guide 
macroeconomics policy.  
Fiscal responsibility laws: A more comprehensive approach would to be to 
provide well designed fiscal responsibility laws (FRLs) covering all levels of 
government (including counties) and with strict transparency requirements. 
Effective FRLs should not be easy to change and suspend, however should be 
accompanied by quantitative targets. 
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